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THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL REFORM*
HoN. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELTt
T IS unnecessary to take time in establishing the fact that the
administration of justice is generally unpopular with the people of
this country. Growing complaint with the law's injustices, delays and
costs has to a great extent characterized every generation. The present
one is no exception. At the present time however, and in such a city
as this, the problem rises in significance beyond the stage of mere dissatisfaction. It becomes a public problem of major importance. Speedy
and efficient justice in a vast community like this is a public necessity,
to be ranked with health, sanitation and police protection. I need
not tell you that it has not yet been adequately provided. Moreover,
in a time of economic distress such as this, the multiplication of legal
actions involving debts increases. The necessity for relief is dccentuated. It is impossible and unnecessary to consider here the extent
to which this situation is caused by technical difficulty. It may be
taken for granted that much of it is due to the fact that the rules
of the legal game are such that in the absence of very strong administrative control it will be used not for a direct search for the truth
but to permit such legal manoeuvers as will further the interests of
those who do not want the truth to be found. The jury trial, for
example, established in order to provide the means for trustworthy
decisions on matters of fact, is used all too frequently for purposes
of delay. Absurd motions likewise enter the picture. In the long run
*Address of Gov. Roosevelt delivered before the Association of the Bar
of tie City of New York on March 12, 1932.
** Governor, State of New York.
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the actual issue comes to be laid over with a whole network of unessential matters of strategy.
So long as years of delay are assured by the condition of the calendars of the courts, this delay itself will be used to threaten those
who have rightful claims. Such delays constitute actual denials of
justice. On the other hand, those defendants who have legitimate
defenses are threatened with long and irritating legal processes. It
is a common thing among courts where reform has been attempted
that the very fact that justice is made more expeditious means the
quick settlement of many cases that should never have been in the
courts at all. Thousands of cases find their way into the courts for
the simple reason that to put them there, with the delay involved, is
to set up a means to force an unjust settlement. Long delay is caused
by non-meritorious cases, and non-meritorious cases are put into the
courts because of long delay. The whole thing is a vicious circle.
The only way to attack the problem is by rigorous application of
judicial efficiency. In the face of this congestion the remedy commonly
proposed is to add new judges or new courts, but it will readily be
seen that if the problem is what I have stated it to be, such a so-called
remedy merely aggravates the complaint. There are, of course, legitimate demands for additional judicial man-power in sections of the
State where the population has grown rapidly. But it is easy to see
that to apply this remedy in all cases is to add to the ravages of the
disease, to contribute to the confusion and, what is profoundly important at this time, to burden still further an already seriously embarrassed taxpayer. With taxes mounting in all of the subdivisions of
government, the time has come for a veritable searching of heart
with regard to the cost of public service, and new demands should be
most carefully scrutinized in the light of this problem of dollars and
cents.
Moreover, the cost to the litigant is very serious. This most applies
not only to the cost imposed by the governmental authorities, but professional fees as well. An English lawyer, in a very discriminating
statement concerning the administration of justice in his own country, recently said justice in no country in the world is so expensive to
obtain as England, except for the United States of America. Writers
and lawyers in Continental countries comment severely on this feature of Anglo-American government. In Germany, according to this
authority, Mr. Claude Mullins ("In Quest of Justice") an ordinary
civil action for fifty pounds can be bought for total fees on both sides
of not more than eighteen pounds. On the other hand, in England
and the United States the cost of litigation is still deeply embedded
in the mysterious recesses of lawyers' accounts; but we may be certain
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that it is much, much higher. Justice, then, is not only delayed, but
it is excessively costly.
Stripped of frills, the problem comes down to a question of administration. Some of the realism that goes into matters less clouded by
theory and tradition needs to be applied to the administration of
justice. There are, of course, important considerations of policy that
distinguish the administration of justice from the administration of
some of the more prosaic activities of life. But it is not too much to
say that the fact that the law is a learned profession and that its exponents are men trained in theoretical wisdom and are quick to distinguish fine shades of meaning has permitted them to invest their
business with an almost mystical attribute that forbids the laying of
the hard hands of common sense on the things that they are doing.
Yet, when you consider the vast portion of cases that come to our
courts, the adjustment of these problems comes down pretty much
to a consideration of the same items of everyday life that we have
in other activities. It would seem to me that there is to be little of
the sacrosanct in the problem of determining whether John Doe did
actually sell a defective bill of goods to Richard Roe. The core of
the matter, after all, is earthly fact, and no manner of theorizing and
of the invocation of precedent is going to solve the essential issue.
If the experience of England is any guide to what we may expect
in the direction of reform, our progress out of the present unsatisfactory condition will be slow and, I fear, painful. In the first place,
we must divest ourselves of the hope of easy reform, participated
in by a few people. The day of the great law-giver is past. A modem,
diversified and almost incoherent society requires that reform be the
resultant of many diversified efforts. Cooperation among the innumerable interests of such a state as ours is necessary, and such cooperation means vastly detailed and patient planning and labor. The history
of law reform in this State has shown this. While many marked improvements have taken place in the past thirty years in connection
with the administration of justice, it has been notable that altogether
too many well-planned attempts at improvement have failed. If we
are to succeed now it must be by widespread cooperation and unflinching labor.
One of the difficulties has been the fact that attempts to reform
have concerned themselves largely with the higher courts of the State.
These courts, as the result of consistent efforts on the part of reformers and largely because of the generally splendid personnel of judges
who have served in them, have been a credit to New York and to
the Nation. It is a matter of pride for the citizens of New York to
consider how widely throughout the various states our Court of Ap-
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peals has been placed not only in the front rank, but preeminent
among the courts of the last resort. While these courts go far to
encourage optimism, it is nevertheless true that our inferior courts
have been and are vastly in need of reconstructive improvement. The
great delay occasioned in some of our city tribunals, the unsatisfactory
nature of justice as it is administered by justices of the peace throughout the State and the unsatisfactory condition in the administration
of criminal justice, all point to the necessity for serious consideration
of those courts that provide the means of justice to the poor and
unfortunate.
In the quest for reform there is no doubt as to the willingness
of leaders of the bar to assist not only individually as lawyers, but
through the various associations throughout the State. Vast energy
and sums of money have been spent in order to justify the expectation of those who believe that lawyers ought to be in the forefront
of reform in this field.
But in spite of this professional cooperation and assistance, 'I
have felt from the beginning that reform cannot ultimately succeed
unless it is participated in and supported by the lay public. Consequently, in the creation of a Commission on the Administration of
Justice for this State, which, after repeated requests, I succeeded in
bringing into existence through the Legislature last winter, I insisted
that there be lay membership. England found in the long struggle
for legal reform in the Nineteenth Century that laymen were
indispensable.
Kenneth Dayton, Chairman of the Committee on Law Reform
of the Association of the Bar, says of the part that laymen played in
law reform in England: "The lesson of the early battlers has not
been lost upon the English public. Increasingly, the examination into
the administration of justice and its improvement has been delegated
to laymen. The first commission appointed in 1850 consisted of seven
attorneys, but on petition of Parliament two business men were added
to the commission. The proportion of laymen upon subsequent commissions has constantly increased. A Parliamentary committee appointed in 1909 contained but one lawyer out of ten members. The
1913 commission was made up of one judge, two lawyers and eight
laymen. Of this commission it was said, 'even this meagre representation of the legal profession was objected to by the commission as
discrediting its report'."
We should not forget the direct interest in the administration of
justice that laymen have; in the last analysis they suffer most from
the slow-moving courts. Moreover, laymen have no vested interests,
except in unusual instances, in the administration of justice. They
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are not lawyers with the fear of antagonizing the judiciary, nor are
they judges who hesitate to reconstruct the conditions under which
they work. Moreover, the intelligent layman is able to cut through
cobwebs that in some way frustrate the efforts of the lawyers.
It is now clear to all thoughtful observers that reform in the
administration of justice means an attack much more fundamental
than the mere alteration of rules of procedure. It is more a problem
of government than of law. It is concerned with questions of administrative policy and with social welfare rather than mere procedure.
This involves a broad search for the experience of other states,
and most certainly of other countries. It means that we should,
wherever possible, adopt the experience of other states. For example,
there has developed throughout the country a system for the management of the calendar which originated, as I understand, in Cleveland, and details of which are familiar to many members of the bar
here. Largely through the leadership of one of your own members,
Mr. Harry D. Nims, the federal courts in New York have adopted
a modification of this system, and now, as I understand it, the Supreme Court of the First Department are in like manner expediting
their business and at the same time saving money for litigants and
taxpayers. Other useful experiments are abroad in the land which
New York should not be long in examining. It is a very gratifying
thing that our State Commission on the Administration of Justice
is keenly aware of the necessity for a consideration of such experience,
has made itself familiar with a number of these ideas and is planning a further search for the benefits of further experience in other
places. To the end that reform of this type may be provided with official state leadership we have at last created a Commission on the
Administration of Justice, which has set to work this past year. As
is indicated in its preliminary report, it has carried on its work with
a number of sound general policies.
This Commission, broadly representative in interest and viewpoint, has diligently applied itself to its task. It has selected its field
of investigation with discrimination; but it has brought within its
purview far more than a mere tinkering with procedure. It has initiated the study of a number of significant subjects, it has called conferences of judges, held public hearings, and in a tactful but effective manner has opened the way to a genuine appraisal and reconsideration of our judicial system. It wisely proceeded with a decorous
abstention from publicity. The trouble with some types of reform is
that they celebrate before the event. They are, as Chesterton drily
remarks, rejoicing in the memory of tomorrow afternoon.
The Commission has sought, through cooperation with the courts,
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and in many other ways, a reasonable program of improvement. It
will, in the year to come, seek to move toward the achievement of
this program. Its main results, it may be assumed, will be indirect,
the courts themselves, through common thought on the subjects at
issue, achieving the beneficial result sought for by all of us.
Because while some legislation, perhaps even a number of constitutional changes are desirable, the most important improvements
can be achieved without new laws. To this end the Commission has
sought and, it reports, secured the interest and cooperation of judges
and lawyers throughout the State. A few weeks ago, for example, at
the request of Senator Walter Westall, Chairman of the Commission,
the four Presiding Justices of the Appellate Divisions of the State,
and other judges, met with the Commission to consider matters of
common interest. This meeting of minds, which, as I understand, will
be continued, cannot help but have a beneficial effect upon the administration of justice throughout the State. Administrative readjustments
of the greatest value can come by the use of customary powers, or,
what is more noteworthy, by the potent influence of suggestion and
example.
A thoughtful judge of this city, Bernard Shientag, commenting
upon the need for judicial statistics, says that "the absence of such
statistics has, more than anything else, checked the progress of the
law." One of the activities that this Commission contemplated for
the coming year is the creation throughout the State of a system by
which there will be for the first time in the history of New York,
adequate statewide statistics concerning all of the courts. It is planned
that this work should be carried on, and if and when a permanent
judicial council is created, the present temporary Commission will
divest itself of this function and transfer it to such a permanent body.
The value of such information, systematically gathered and intelligently presented, is of extraordinary importance. It will give officials
themselves a picture of the state of litigation in the courts which will
permit us to know what work the courts are doing, how much of it
there is, and how long it takes to dispose of cases. It will, I hope,
be a permanent and accurate guide to the Legislature in the creation
of new courts and new judges. It will give us the assurance that we
shall not be permitted to enact legislation adding to the expense of
the courts, without accurate scientific means of knowing the extent
of the need and whether it is immediately necessary.
What I have said of law reform may in many respects be applied
with singular appropriateness to much of public life today. The
general wisdom of the demand for fewer laws is undeniable. But
its necessary correlative principle is to use with intelligence and energy
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the powers that we have. Administration, informed, energetic, and
economical, is the deep need of government today. The public, particularly in these moments of deep stress,- deserves of its servants an
example of unselfish application to duty. Let us remember that every
member of the bar has something of the character of a public servant,
and that he owes it to his profession and to the public to encourage
and to give his efforts for important and even drastic improvements in
the administration of justice.

